

*"Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world"...*<sup>1</sup>

## **I. Friendly Relations Between Nations**

The preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights begins with the premise that human rights are fundamental to 'peace in the world'. This is a bold claim. The connection between human rights and freedom is obvious, if tautological, and the connection to justice still sensible. But peace is the domain of nations, and the breakdown of that peace into war usually ascribed to factors of international significance. So the Preamble elaborates: "Whereas it is essential to promote the development of friendly relations between nations," where 'it' refers again to the 'recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family' —or, more concisely, observance of human rights. The claim is that observance of human rights is a necessary condition for peace among nations.<sup>2</sup> This theory informs much of the post-war order, but has never been tested systematically.

This project provides that test, beginning with the question: does the protection of human rights at home decrease the likelihood that states will use military force abroad? The proposed project takes the following steps: first, a theoretical chapter framing the relationship between human rights and the state and proposing mechanisms for that relationship; second, a large-N test of the relationship between human rights observance and military conflict. The remaining chapters study possible mechanisms for the relationship between state and human rights: an analysis of party politics and human rights

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1 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. <https://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml>

2 Note that the Declaration does differentiate between nations and countries (or states). Article 15 gives persons the right to choose a nationality, apparently without regard to state or country, where article 13 and 14 speak more specifically of rights relevant to state legal jurisdiction. However, the organization —though comprised of countries —does call itself 'United Nations'; the difference between nations and countries in the Declaration is likely not intended to be a bright line.

observance in democratic states; and an analysis of human rights observance as a constraint on the state's ability to extract resources for conflict.

## **II. Theory: rights and power**

This section describes an understanding of human rights ideals as a theory of the state; provides an overview of political science and International Relations work on human rights thus far, including the democratic peace literature; and develops mechanisms by which those ideals might affect the operations of the state with respect to foreign conflict.

### *Human rights as theory of the state*

The phrase 'human rights' is often used as though it were well-understood, when in fact it is highly contested. Before human rights can exist in an empirical sense, there must be at least an idea or claim that they *should* exist. We can call these claims 'human rights ideals', or HRI, to differentiate them from circumstances in which human rights exist as a matter of policy or practice. Human rights ideals are usually understood as claims about God and/or human nature, but as political ideas these arguments are better understood as claims against the state. And by thus bracketing out these epistemological aspects, "human rights are not held in some metaphysical suspended animation, but are practical tools used to limit the worst forms of human behaviour while creating conditions for the protection of human dignity".<sup>3</sup> We can then ask usefully how HRI are used in political interactions, especially between people and their states. The claims made in HRI, if successful, should result in constraint on the state's ability to use force in its domestic affairs; that is, the recognition and the

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3 Landman, Todd (2005). "The Political Science of Human Rights". *British Journal of Political Science* 35:3 (July), p. 553

realization of human rights as a matter of policy and practice should prevent the state from use of force against its citizens. Human rights ideals are thus a kind of theory of the state, in which a specific relationship between state and society is established through prohibition of certain powers to the state.

This understanding of HRI as theory of the state derives from the classical liberal position which holds individuals as paramount in society, and which requires a "theory of resistance" to the absolutist Leviathan.<sup>4</sup> In this view the greatest threat to the individual is tyranny from the government; one early writer stated plainly that "Unalienable Rights are essential Limitations in all Governments".<sup>5</sup> These arguments were taken up by revolutionaries in North America and France; it is from Thomas Paine, an American revolutionary writing in defense of the French Revolution, that the phrase 'human rights' enters our lexicon.<sup>6</sup> These arguments were then instantiated in the (US) 'Bill of Rights' and the (French) 'Declaration of the Rights of Man and of Citizens' explicitly as limitations on what the respective governments could do to their citizens. At least in this early period, HRI were widely understood as arguments for constraints on the absolutist state.

This understanding has eroded since World War II. On the one hand, the horrors of Nazism and the Holocaust were widely understood as the overreach of states against their citizens. One scholar notes, "it is only slight exaggeration to say that prior to the end of the Second World War, the state, with respect to the treatment of its own people, was a 'moral black box'".<sup>7</sup> Certain post-war institutions — the United Nations and Council of Europe, especially — were organized with concern for human rights central to their rationale. The former, as discussed above, saw human rights ideals as a means to 'freedom, justice and peace in the world', although the UN was not specifically established to protect human rights and does not provide a significant enforcement mechanism. Moreover, where HRI have

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4 Vincent, R.J. (1986). *Human Rights in International Relations*. (UK: Cambridge U. Press), p. 17, 23.

5 Hutcheson, Frances (1725[2004]). *An Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue*. (Indianapolis, IN; Liberty Fund Books), p. 192. Available online here: [http://files.libertyfund.org/files/858/0449\\_LFeBk.pdf](http://files.libertyfund.org/files/858/0449_LFeBk.pdf)

6 Simpson, A. W. Brian (2004). *Human Rights and the End of Empire: Britain and the Genesis of the European Convention*" (UK; Oxford U. Press), p.9

7 Simmons, Beth (2009). *Mobilizing for Human Rights*. (NY; Cambridge U. Press), p. 39

come into conflict with the contrary principle of state sovereignty, the United Nations has typically favored the latter. One scholar notes, "in the first twenty years of the United Nations, it seemed that, in the matter of human rights at least, international society was successfully defending the principle of exclusive state authority".<sup>8</sup> This only began to change with the rise of post-colonial and developing countries and their broader claims on the core members of the UN.

Meanwhile, quite unlike the UN, the Council of Europe became unusual among international human rights regimes for its robust enforcement mechanism, the European Court of Human Rights. The Council was motivated by the argument that "The tyrannical regime which enslaves its own people sooner or later seeks to impose its domination upon its neighbors... in consequence the freedom of each is the concern of all".<sup>9</sup> This is a clear appeal to HRI and a specific account of how domestic human rights practices might affect the stability of the international system. This view found its most visible supporter in Winston Churchill, who after his loss in the 1945 election took up European solidarity and prompted the organization of a conference to that end;<sup>10</sup> at the opening of the conference, Churchill spoke for the adoption "a Charter of Human Rights, guarded by freedom and sustained by law", which he saw as a necessary bulwark against "all forms of tyranny, ancient or modern, Nazi or Communist".<sup>11</sup> That states should be limited by the human rights of their citizens was the antidote to tyranny, and one of the first acts of the Council states "the aim of the Council of Europe is the achievement of greater unity between its members and that one of the methods by which that aim is to be pursued is the maintenance and further realisation of human rights and fundamental freedoms".<sup>12</sup> The Council's emphasis on human rights was also directed against the newly Communist regimes of eastern Europe:

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8 Vincent, R.J. (1986). *Human Rights in International Relations*. (UK: Cambridge U. Press), p. 100

9 European Movement (1949). *The European Movement and the Council of Europe*. (New York), p. 111.

10 Norman, Jesse and Peter Osborne (2009). "Churchill's Legacy: The Conservative Case for the Human Rights Act". (London, UK: Liberty), p. 19.

11 Churchill, Winston (1948). Address to the the Congress of Europe. The Hague, Netherlands, May 7, 1948. available online here: <http://www.churchill-society-london.org.uk/WSCHague.html>

12 Council of Europe (1950). "Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms". Rome, 4 November. available online here: <http://www.conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/005.htm>

In a number of European states the rights of sovereignty are being used to justify the suppression of free speech, free elections and free parliaments, arrests without warrant and imprisoning without trial, political and religious persecutions, torture and murder; in short, the violation and complete negation of every principle of humanity and civilization.<sup>13</sup>

One study of the Council's human rights regime notes that it allows unusual intrusion into the affairs of sovereign countries, but was brought about in part by fragile post-war governments to constrain future officeholders' actions against their citizens.<sup>14</sup> The prerogatives of sovereignty were trumped by the threat to civilization of tyrannic regimes.

As these organizations came into being, states and their representatives arrived in the curious position of now advocating for limitations on state power as crucial to international peace — in effect advocating for their own limitation. The fact that in most cases — the Council of Europe excepted — states preferred non-binding, non-enforced commitments should be unsurprising. Even in the formation of the Council of Europe, "It was then believed that human rights were already adequately protected in member states".<sup>15</sup> These agreements may well be understood as serving a signaling function among the states, and secondarily to the citizens of signatories, but do not *per se* indicate acceptance of the constraints advocated in HRI. And though the Western states lead the push for international human rights, these ideas were seized on by other states to deprecate policies of colonialism, racism, and capitalism, among other aspects of Western civilization. The adoption by the UN General Assembly in 1960 of the 'Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples' can be seen as a turning point in this respect. The British in particular, as a leading proponents of HRI in the international system, saw those ideals turned against their colonial policies.<sup>16</sup> Moreover, the argument advanced by countries in the global South placed a priority on subsistence rights, which hold states

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13 European Movement (1949). *The European Movement and the Council of Europe*. (New York), p. 112

14 Moravcsik, Andrew (2000). "The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe". *International Organization* 54:2 (Spring), p. 281

15 Simpson, A. W. Brian (2004). *Human Rights and the End of Empire: Britain and the Genesis of the European Convention*" (UK; Oxford U. Press), p. 5; see also European Movement (1949). *The European Movement and the Council of Europe*. (New York), p. 124.

16 Simpson, A. W. Brian (2004). *Human Rights and the End of Empire: Britain and the Genesis of the European Convention*" (UK; Oxford U. Press), *passim*

obliged to provide for the economic and social welfare of individuals.<sup>17</sup> This is a broader claim than the constraints implied by civil and political rights, and something Northern countries resisted as well. But no matter the disagreement, the claims and counterclaims of international human rights are typically advanced by states against other states; the fact that states have assumed the rhetoric of human rights has blurred the original understanding of HRI, which held rights and state power in sharp contrast.

### *Political Science, IR and human rights*

In political science, human rights are a relatively new but growing concern. APSA's Human Rights section was created only in 2001, and less than 3% of recent articles in major political science journals are concerned with human rights, up from around 1% in the 1980s.<sup>18</sup> Comparative Politics in particular has taken up human rights, with a number of studies examining repression across countries.<sup>19</sup>

International Relations has also produced a significant literature on human rights. Some of these studies are focused on compliance with human rights treaties; at best, there are mixed results for the efficacy of human treaties in encouraging human rights practices among ratifiers.<sup>20</sup> One study finds an interaction effect with regime type, such that democracies are more likely to comply with human rights treaties, and autocracies more likely to breach.<sup>21</sup> Another study argues that treaties do affect human rights compliance, because they "*change politics* — in particular the domestic politics of the ratifying countries".<sup>22</sup> Other studies take human rights as a subset of international norms, focusing on how such norms arise and diffuse, and especially how international actors can encourage domestic

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17 Vincent, R.J. (1986). *Human Rights in International Relations*. (UK: Cambridge U. Press), p. 73

18 Cardenas, Sonia (2009). "Mainstreaming Human Rights". *PS: Political Science and Politics* 42: 1 (Jan), p. 161.

19 e.g. Poe, Steven C. and C. Neal Tate (1994). "Repression of Human Rights to Personal Integrity in the 1980s: A Global Analysis". *American Political Science Review* 88:4 (December), p. 853-872

20 Hafner-Burton, Emilie and Kiyoteru Tsutsui (2005). "Human Rights in a Globalizing World: The Paradox of Empty Promises". *American Journal of Sociology* 110:5 (March), p. 1373-1411; Hathaway, Oona (2002). "Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?" *Yale Law Journal* 111, p. 1935- 2041.

21 Neumayer, Eric (2005). "Do International Human Rights Treaties Improve Respect for Human Rights?" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49:6 (December), pp. 925-953.

22 Simmons, Beth (2009). *Mobilizing for Human Rights*. (NY; Cambridge U. Press), p. 113, emphasis original

observance of such norms.<sup>23</sup>

An overview of International Relations scholarship on human rights distills this literature into two distinct flavors:

two debates are occurring —one among quantitative scholars on the causes of repression, and the degree to which human rights norms have influenced foreign policy decisions over aid — and a second among more qualitative international relations scholars over liberal, realist, and constructivist explanations for the origins, evolution, and effectiveness of human rights norms and institutions.<sup>24</sup>

Another review finds similar results, and shows that conflict is only understood in the literature as an influence on human rights.<sup>25</sup> While useful, this work has been almost wholly engaged in human rights as outcomes of the international system, not inputs.

What lacks in this literature is robust examination of the possibility that human rights can reduce conflict in international politics. Only one study has explored this possibility, by testing international conflict behavior against human rights practices to find "a strong relationship between joint respect for human rights and peace".<sup>26</sup> The authors argue that countries which respect human rights have a normative bias against violence, and that when two such countries come into conflict that bias predisposes them to settle their conflicts peacefully. In their view, the relationship between human rights and conflict only holds dyadically — on a pairwise basis — a premise adopted from the democratic peace literature. Chapter 3 discusses this study in more depth.

In the democratic peace literature, human rights observance has long been considered one factor among many to determine the level of democracy in each country. For example, Freedom House's rankings, a widely used dataset in the democratic peace literature, are extensively concerned with

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23 e.g. Keck, Margaret and Kathryn Sikkink (1998). *Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics*. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell U. Press); Finnmore, Martha and Kathryn Sikkink (1998). "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change". *International Organization* 52:4 (Autumn)

24 Schmitz, Hans Peter and Kathryn Sikkink (2002). "International Human Rights". in Carlsnaes, Walter; Thomas Risse; and Beth A Simmons (eds.). *Handbook of International Relations*. (Thousand Oaks, CA; Sage, 2002) p. 532

25 Landman, Todd (2005). "The Political Science of Human Rights". *British Journal of Political Science* 35:3 (July), p. 566

26 Sobek, David; M. Rodwan Abouharb; and Christopher G. Ingram (2006). "The Human Rights Peace: How the Respect for Human Rights at Home Leads to Peace Abroad". *Journal of Politics* 68:3 (August), p. 527.

human rights, including a number of questions as 'civil liberties' which draw directly from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.<sup>27</sup> Studies using these rankings often focus on human rights as a component of broader democratic norms. One observer summarizes this understanding:

the basic norm of democratic theory is that disputes can be resolved without force through democratic political processes that in some balance ensure both majority rule and minority rights. A norm of equality operates both as voting equality and certain egalitarian rights to human dignity. [...] Resort to organized lethal violence, or the threat of it, is considered illegitimate, and unnecessary to secure one's "legitimate" rights.<sup>28</sup>

Doyle explains that this view derives from Kant's assertion that liberal republics which maintain a "principled respect for nondiscriminatory human rights [...] should produce a commitment to respect the rights of fellow liberal republics (because they represent free citizens, who as individual have rights that deserve our respect and a suspicion of nonrepublics (because if those governments cannot trust their own citizens, what should lead us to trust them?)" —but this is only one of three necessary conditions for liberal peace.<sup>29</sup> Several studies have shown empirical support for the claim that democratic norms drive the democratic peace.<sup>30</sup>

The claim that the relevant aspects of democracy are normative comprises roughly half of the democratic peace literature; the balance holds that institutional structures constrain democratic leaders by making their decisions to go to war especially accountable to the same public who would bear the costs of that decision.<sup>31</sup> The connection between rights and democracy in these accounts can be

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27 Freedom House (2011). "Freedom in the World 2011: Checklist Questions and Guidelines". Available online at <http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-2011/checklist-questions-and-guidelines>

28 Russett, Bruce (1996). "Why Democratic Peace?" in Brown, Michael; Sean M. Lynn-Jones; and Steven E. Miller (eds.), *Debating the Democratic Peace* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press), p. 92

29 Doyle, Michael (1996). "Michael Doyle on the Democratic Peace —Again". in Brown, Michael; Sean M. Lynn-Jones; and Steven E. Miller (eds.), *Debating the Democratic Peace* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press), p. 366

30 e.g. Maoz, Zeev and Bruce Russett (1993). "Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace, 1946-1986". *American Political Science Review* 87:3 (September), pp. 624-638

31 e.g. Babst, Dean (1960). "Elective Governments - A force for peace". *Wisconsin Sociologist* pp. 914 Bueno De Mesquita, Bruce; James D. Morrow; Randolph Siverson; and Alastair Smith (1999). "An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace". *American Political Science Review* 93:4 (December), pp. 791-807; Raknerud, Arvid and Havard Hegre (1997). "The Hazard of War: Reassessing the Evidence for the Democratic Peace". *Journal of Peace Research* 34:4 pp. 385-404; Cederman, Lars-Erik (2001). "Back to Kant: Reinterpreting the Democratic Peace as a Macrohistorical Learning Process". *American Political Science Review* 95:1 (March), pp. 15-31



somewhat tenuous; one study allows a country to be considered democratic if only 10% of its adult population is allowed to vote.<sup>32</sup> A more recent study tests institutional constraints against normative constraints, and finds evidence for the former over the latter, finding democracies "less likely to use force regardless of the regime type of the opposition"; according to that account, the "normative approach focuses on the the socialization of leaders within the domestic sphere whereas the institutional approach emphasizes the domestic political costs of using force".<sup>33</sup> However, this elides the possibility that the domestic political costs of using force might be primarily ideational — on which more in the next section.

The democratic peace literature has also been widely criticized, in particular that the concept of democracy is too broad and too flexible to produce meaningful empirical research. One such critique gives significant weight to the scope and nature of the rights considered 'democratic':

distinctions must be drawn between states that have constraints on their leaders, that require accountability of their leaders, that are liberal (defined in terms of political liberties and rights), that provide a limited role for a hereditary monarch to choose governmental leaders [...], that are republican (equal rights among the —possibly minority —group of decision-making citizens), that are democratic (defined in terms of voting rights), and that are libertarian ([...] in terms of a combination of political and economic freedoms).<sup>34</sup>

Rights also play a significant role in the criticism that the democratic peace literature ignores colonial wars. The contradiction between, on the one hand, the enjoyment of rights normally associated with democracies and, on the other, colonial repression committed by these democracies has not been adequately addressed within the literature. One critique argues that the history of imperialism by democratic powers of Europe and North America demonstrates the failure of the normative logic of the

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32 Small, Melvin and J. David Singer (1976). "The War-Proneness of Democratic Regimes, 1816-1965". *Jerusalem Journal of International Relations* 1:4 (Summer), p. 53

33 Rosseau, David (2005). *Democracy and War: Institutions, norms, and the evolution of international conflict*. (Stanford, CA: Stanford U. Press), pp. 201-202

34 Chernoff, Fred (2004). "The Study of Democratic Peace and Progress in International Relations". *International Studies Review* 6:1 (March), p. 57.

democratic peace.<sup>35</sup> This line of criticism extends into the way data are coded, which typically exclude colonial (or 'extra-state') wars from datasets and subsequent analysis; one example is France, which despite its brutal colonial record "is coded by Polity IV as +10 — the highest level of democracy — from 1871 on".<sup>36</sup> There is obvious tension between the maintenance of colonial oppression and the claim that democracies are inherently more rights-observing and peaceful than nondemocracies.

A further problem for the democratic peace is that democratic support for human rights — as opposed to practice — can encourage military intervention, ostensibly to promote those rights in other countries.<sup>37</sup> Because human rights advocates have successfully framed violation as a threat to peace, since the 1990s the link between the two has become "institutionalized in international institutions", permitting military action against countries which might previously have avoided it.<sup>38</sup>

### *From rights to peace*

Despite the widespread belief after World War II that promoting human rights would lead to peace, the exact mechanism imagined in that process is not supported by empirical evidence — namely that preventing tyranny would lead to peace. There is instead compelling evidence that tyrannies — authoritarian or dictatorial regimes — are no more likely to fight wars than stable democracies. One review holds that "the results of most studies indicate that democracies are no less warprone than other forms of government".<sup>39</sup> Even proponents of the dyadic democratic peace will admit democracies "*are not less likely to be conflict prone than nondemocracies*" (emphasis original).<sup>40</sup> There is research to

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35 Rosato, Sebastian (2003). "The Flawed Logic of the Democratic Peace Theory". *American Political Science Review* 97:4 (November), p. 589

36 Henderson, Errol A. (2002). *Democracy and War: the end of an illusion?* (Boulder, CO; Lynne Rienner), p. 79

37 Lebovic, James H. (2004). "Uniting for Peace? Democracies and United Nations Peace Operations after the Cold War". *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48:6 (December), pp. 910-936

38 Finnemore, Martha (2003). *The Purposes of Intervention* (Ithaca, NY; Cornell U. Press), p. 135-136

39 Morgan, T. Clifton and Sally Campbell (1991). "Domestic Structure, Decisional Constraints, and War: So why do democracies fight?" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 35:2 (June), p. 188

40 Maoz, Zeev and Bruce Russett (1993). "Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace, 1946-1986". *American Political Science Review* 87:3 (September), p. 624; emphasis original

challenge this claim, to the effect that democracies are more peaceful in monad than nondemocracies, but this work is not widely accepted as conclusive.<sup>41</sup>

Yet there may be other mechanisms by which governments observant of human rights are constrained or prevented from using force in their foreign affairs. The problem for the original mechanism — and the democratic peace theory — is that democratic governments are not consistently observant of HRI. But the fact that human rights ideals favor democratic governance is not the only pathway from those ideals to peace.

Where human rights ideals are embedded in society — that is, widely accepted by the populace — violation of those ideals creates domestic political costs for the government. This is a hybrid of the institutional-normative debate described above: whether or not elites are socialized into certain normative constraints, the fact that society holds those norms presents — especially in democratic countries — a constraint against the government. Actions contrary to embedded HRI impose a cost on the government from its domestic audience; a rough example is the blow to credibility the U.S. government suffered in the last decade when its torture practices were exposed.<sup>42</sup> Where many studies take the cost of conflict as essentially human — namely, casualties<sup>43</sup> — this approach allows for an ideational and normative cost associated with the state's use of force, both domestically and abroad. Moreover, human rights ideals claim specific constraints on the state, which might affect the government's ability to mobilize for military action (through specific mechanisms described below). Those HRIs which most specifically speak to the state's use of force should correlate strongly with use of force — namely, those protecting persons from death, torture, arbitrary detention, or other physical

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41 Rousseau, David (2005). *Democracy and War: Institutions, norms, and the evolution of international conflict*. (Stanford, CA: Stanford U. Press); MacMillan, John (2003). "Beyond the Separate Democratic Peace". *Journal of Peace Research* 40:2 (March), p. 233-243

42 Note that the US does not have a particularly strong human rights record among democracies, and is likely an example of democratic governance absent strong HRI observance. The example is only convenient, not definitive.

43 Merom, Gil (2003). *How Democracies Lose Small Wars: State, Society, and the Failures of France in Algeria, Israel in Lebanon, and the United States in Vietnam* (UK; Cambridge U. Press).

abuse. These rights are often called 'Personal Integrity Rights' (PIRs), after U.S. State Department reporting practices on the subject of human rights.<sup>44</sup> Table 1 (appended) lists personal integrity rights described in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

*Hypothesis 1: States which respect personal integrity rights are less likely to be involved in fatal militarized disputes than states which violate PIRs.*

Although the relationship between HRI and militarized disputes is postulated here is essentially monadic — that is, specific to the state independent of its antagonists — there may be important dyadic consequences. States which respect human rights, when faced with opponents who do not respect those rights, may adjust their responses to account for the expectation that the opposing state does not face similar constraints. A parallel line of reasoning animates much of the dyadic literature on the democratic peace theory. Where human rights are concerned, we might expect the dyadic effects to inform the escalation of conflict, meaning the steps between the first hint of confrontation through threats to actual use of force. States with strong human rights may recognize in other such states the constraints both face, and may be able to rely on those constraints rather than their own posture of military readiness and strength.

*Hypothesis 2: States which respect personal integrity rights are less likely to escalate military disputes against states which also respect PIRs, and more likely to escalate against states which do not respect PIRs.*

On the other hand, Hypothesis 1 suggests states which do not respect human rights are more likely to become involved in militarized disputes; such states may see the constraints facing an opponent state with strong human rights protection as a form of weakness. This perception of weakness may increase the non-HR-observant state's expectation of success in a military confrontation — on the

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<sup>44</sup> Cingranelli, David and Thomas Pasquarello (1985). "Human Rights Practices and the Distribution of U.S. Foreign Aid to Latin American Countries". *American Journal of Political Science* 29:3 (August), p. 546

grounds that the HR-observant state is less likely to respond effectively — and thereby increase the likelihood of conflict initiation.

*Hypothesis 3: States which do not respect personal integrity rights are more likely to initiate militarized disputes against states which do respect PIRs.*

The mechanisms connecting these rights to use of force abroad are difficult to discern, and very little research has sought to do so. One study examines norms of retributive justice, and finds that strong support for such norms correlates with support for domestic and international use of force.<sup>45</sup> It is likely that retributive justice is one in a cluster of norms concerning the state and use of force, along with human rights ideals; the discovery and description of further specific norms is beyond the scope of this project. Suffice to say that there is evidence that how people think about the state tends to be consistent across domestic and international affairs. It is thus helpful to ask whether those rights which specifically limit domestic use of force correlate with use of force abroad. This question depends somewhat on the assumption that where human rights are practiced, human rights ideals play a role, even indirectly.

Note that the focus on PIRs opens this project to criticism leveled more generally at political science: "The field has also been dominated by a concern over a narrow set of human rights, to the virtual neglect of economic, social and cultural rights. Such a narrow focus is partly explained by dominant American conceptions of rights and freedoms".<sup>46</sup> While sensitive to this criticism, the present study nonetheless focuses primarily on those rights which address most directly the state's use of force in its domestic affairs.

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45 Stein, Rachel (2011). Unpublished dissertation chapter.

46 Landman, Todd (2005). "The Political Science of Human Rights". *British Journal of Political Science* 35:3 (July), p. 556

### *Mechanism 1. Parties, platforms, and policies*

One direct route connecting HRI and use of force abroad is through democratic governance. From the democratic peace hypothesis, we might expect that if democracy protects a population from war, it also protects the population from the predations of the state. The correlation between democracy and human rights is well-established — in fact, this connection is somewhat tautological, as the procedural institutions of democratic governance (e.g. voting) are widely considered human rights *per se*. Yet the broader set of human rights, including economic and social rights as well as some personal integrity rights, are not always observed in all democratic countries. So it is not that democracy itself provides sufficient protection from human rights violations; whether such protection exists depends at least in part on the extent to which human rights ideals inform policy. It is then necessary to find statements of HRI by policymakers, and discern whether the resultant policies are consistent with the stated HRI.

Rather than focus narrowly on individual policymakers, it is more efficient to look at parties — that is, groups of citizens organized to seek elective office under a common label.<sup>47</sup> Parties generally organize around specific ideologies, which inform their policy preferences. These ideologies tend to be consistent over time.<sup>48</sup> The most common metric used to measure party ideology is a simple left-right scale, with Socialist parties holding the leftmost spot, Conservatives the rightmost, and other major parties somewhere in between. Virtually all parties can be readily located on a the left-right spectrum, and there is remarkable correlation in Western democratic countries on the baskets of policies which make up left versus right; knowing a party's position on one issue gives a good idea of where it stands on many issues. However, for most such countries, the left-right distinction tells us very little about

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47 This rough definition is derived from the several presented in White, John Kenneth (2006). "What is a Political Party?" in Richard S. Katz and William Crotty (eds.) *Handbook of Party Politics*. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage), p. 6

48 Vassallo, Francesca and Clyde Wilcox (2006). "Party as a Carrier of Ideas", in Richard S. Katz and William Crotty (eds.) *Handbook of Party Politics*. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage), p. 414.

human rights. The extant research suggests left-tilting parties tend to favor socially liberal policies — which include claims of rights to abortion, gay/lesbian equality, and strong social welfare programs — while Conservative policies tend to favor strong property rights. As a result, "classical liberalism... — which combines support for socially liberal policies with laissez-faire economics — has no unambiguous place a left-right socio-economic scale".<sup>49</sup> This means that there is no reliable way to discern a party's ideology with respect to HRI from a simple left-right scale.

This question requires a more fine-grained approach, which can be found in the study of party platforms, or manifestos. Party platforms describe the party's ideology and policy goals, holding "a unique position as the only fully authoritative statement of the party policy for an election [...] As such they have been shown to have an important agenda-setting role for governments".<sup>50</sup> In most democracies, party platforms establish the ideological signposts by which candidates are to be evaluated and elected; the US is the major exception to this rule.<sup>51</sup> Although platforms can be bland and similar across parties within a given society, it is instead the respective positions of the parties governing different countries which is of interest here. Across countries, there ought to be some consistency between platform of the party in power and the policy outcomes of the government.

Despite a significant agenda in comparative politics focused on party politics, very little research looked at how party ideologies and platforms translate into policy outcomes.<sup>52</sup> It was previously assumed that parties were interested solely in obtaining political power, and their policy preferences important only as a means to power. More recent studies — which tend to favor Western European democracies — have argued that parties do play an important role in formation of

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49 Benoit, Kenneth and Michael Lavar (2006). *Party Policy in Modern Democracies*. (UK; Routledge), p. 132

50 Budge, Ian (1994). "A New Spatial Theory of Party Competition: Uncertainty, Ideology, and Policy Equilibrium." *British Journal of Political Science* 24:4 (October), p. 455

51 Vassallo, Francesca and Clyde Wilcox (2006). "Party as a Carrier of Ideas", in Richard S. Katz and William Crotty (eds.) *Handbook of Party Politics*. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage), p. 416.

52 Blondel, Jean and Jaakko Nousiainen (2000). in Jean Blondel and Maurizio Cotta (eds.). *The Nature of Party Government: A comparative European perspective*. (London; Palgrave), p. 161

government policies.<sup>53</sup> However, the link between party and policy is more complex than it might appear; parties and governments face different incentives and different constraints: "Parties primarily have an ideological dimension, which manifests itself through policy demands; governments rule the nation and this inevitably constrains their behaviour".<sup>54</sup> The result is that policy-making processes are not typically dominated by party ideology; governments play the greater role in initiating policies, but parties play an important role in elaborating those policies.<sup>55</sup>

In democratic countries, it is generally the case that the elected leaders responsible for the military are also responsible for domestic security, as well — presidents, prime ministers, parliaments. Few if any governments allow for the election of separate, autonomous officers for domestic and foreign policy respectively. Thus the party which is in power in a given year should affect the domestic and foreign policy of that government in similar ways. Although research shows that foreign policy diverges from the usual left-right understanding in the party position literature, and is somewhat a distinct domain for intra-state party competition, it is important to remember that the relevant comparison is not between ideologies of competing parties *within* states, but between ideologies of ruling parties *across* states.

*Hypothesis 4: Ruling parties whose platforms emphasize HRI are more likely to protect human rights and less likely to enter into military disputes.*

Party politics present the most explicit mechanism by which HRI become incorporated into state policy. Nonetheless, this mechanism is complicated and perhaps subtle, requiring the following steps:

1. A political party drafts a manifesto which include specific statements regarding HRI.

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53 Budge, Ian and Hans Keman (1990). *Parties and Democracy*. (UK; Oxford U. Press)

54 Blondel, Jean and Jaakko Nousiainen (2000). in Jean Blondel and Maurizio Cotta (eds.). *The Nature of Party Government: A comparative European perspective*. (London; Palgrave), p. 168

55 Blondel, Jean and Jaakko Nousiainen (2000). in Jean Blondel and Maurizio Cotta (eds.). *The Nature of Party Government: A comparative European perspective*. (London; Palgrave), p. 168



2. The policy platform is consistent with respect to the state's use of force, so that strong HRI advocacy is not associated with imperialist expansion or militarism.
3. The electorate has to favor this party —not necessarily because of the platforms' statements concerning HRI —and deliver it to power.
4. The party, once in power, is able to implement policy based to some degree on its platform.

A failure in any of these steps would likely sever the link between platform and policy; this suggests moderation in any expectations for the linkage between ideology and outcomes. However, the sensitivity of this mechanism suggests that any evidence of a link between platform and policy with respect to HRI would tend to confirm its operation. It is difficult to imagine that a party would not include HRI in its platform but would somehow make meaningful implementation of HRI as policy, unless compelled to by external forces—which the literature discussed above suggests is not likely. It is not impossible that a party with HRI in its platform would be unable to effect those policies when in office, but difficult to imagine that such a party, if able, would effect those policies for reasons wholly unrelated to its platform.

### *Mechanism 2. Extraction*

Another mechanism by which HRIs can prevent use of military force is by limiting the state's capacity to extract resources prior to disputes. Human rights theory argues for limits on what states can do to their own citizens; this includes limits on direct violence (extra-judicial killing) but also indirect violence against economic or social rights. Previous studies have focused on the costs to society of war in terms of casualties,<sup>56</sup> but this is in fact a small portion of the demands military effort places on a state's public. States typically require resources above their normal extraction from society in order to

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<sup>56</sup> Merom, Gil (2003). *How Democracies Lose Small Wars: State, Society, and the Failures of France in Algeria, Israel in Lebanon, and the United States in Vietnam* (UK; Cambridge U. Press).

sustain military effort, and these resources usually come from the populace of the state itself in the form of military service, additional revenue, and expropriation of materiel. States observant of HRI have limitations on the extent to which they can compel their citizens to pay for military action; because they cannot take military extraction for granted, such states should be deterred somewhat from committing to use of force abroad.<sup>57</sup>

### *Extraction: Conscription*

The crucial resource states require for military strength is manpower. Many states use conscription to ensure adequate numbers of soldiers: young men are required to serve, or face penalties. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights says nothing about conscription; nor has it been dealt with in similar IGO institutions, such as the Council of Europe. Yet conscription is clearly detrimental to some of the rights recognized by states, such as liberty, conscience, religious belief, and economic rights concerning choice of profession. In the U.S., economists in particular have argued against conscription as a violation of human rights; Milton Friedman was among the authors of a government report arguing that an all-volunteer military was "the system for maintaining standing forces that minimizes government interference with the freedom of the individual to determine his own life in accord with his values"; the economic argument further holds that an all-volunteer military would be *more* democratic than a conscript army, precisely because it spreads the burden of military taxation more widely in society.<sup>58</sup> These arguments emphasize the economic rights concerns with conscription,

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57 An obvious implication of this argument is that military spending should be in some way limited by human rights observance. However, the literature on domestic determinants of military spending is simultaneously underdeveloped and substantively complicated. This suggests that analysis of military expenditure is beyond the scope of this project.

58 Gates, Thomas; Thomas Curtis; Frederick Dent; Milton Friedman; Crawford Greenewalt; Alan Greenspan; Gen. Alfred Guenther; Stephen Herbits; Father Theodore Hesburgh; Jerome Holland; John Kemper; Jeanne Noble; Gen. Lauris Norstad; W. Allen Wallis; Roy Wilkins (1970). "The Report of the President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force". (Washington, DC; Government Printing Office, February 1970), pp. 6, 25 available at <http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG265/images/webS0243.pdf>

but there are clear personal integrity rights consequences from required military service.

Analyses of conscription in political science have been few so far. Most prominent is Levi's argument that conscription practice demonstrates 'contingent consent': Levi shows that while the people of a given country might oppose conscription as policy, in practice they generally comply because the costs otherwise are too high..<sup>59</sup> This project is not antagonistic towards Levi; her concern is domestic compliance with conscription policy, where this study focuses on what policies constrain government behavior. However, her argument does not address change in policy over time, and does not account for why a government would abandon conscription apart from widespread noncompliance: since World War II, all six of her case study countries have abolished or suspended conscription.<sup>60</sup> Levi argues with respect to conscientious objection that "change follows a major publicity campaign and is incremental in nature",<sup>61</sup> but available evidence suggests that most countries abolishing conscription have not done so due to 'major publicity campaigns'.

Since World War II, the trend has been toward volunteer armies — that is, against conscription. Of the 90 countries described in the first-of-its-kind 1968 survey of conscription policies,<sup>62</sup> which still exist as substantially similar polities today, some 65 (72%) had conscription; at least 23 of these countries have abolished, suspended, or do not enforce their conscription policies, according to updated data.<sup>63</sup> Two more, according to extant data, have made plans to abolish conscription in the near future. Seven of these states, primarily developing countries, have adopted conscription since 1968. According to the same data, among 176 currently existing countries for which definite information is available, 88 (50%) use conscription. The rest have abolished, suspended, or do not enforce their policies. Another

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59 Levi, Margaret (1997). *Consent, dissent, and patriotism*. (UK: Cambridge U. Press).

60 France, Britain, United States, Canada, New Zealand, Australia. In fact, all of these countries except France did so well prior to the publication of *Consent, dissent, and patriotism*,

61 Levi, Margaret (1997). *Consent, dissent, and patriotism*. (UK: Cambridge). p. 198

62 Prasad, Devi and Tony Smythe (1968). *Conscription: A World Survey*. (London: War Resisters International)

63 War Resisters International. "World survey of conscription and conscientious objection to military service". (Brussels; Quaker Council for European Affairs), [http://www.wri-irg.org/programmes/world\\_survey](http://www.wri-irg.org/programmes/world_survey); author's coding and analysis according to source definitions.

source says that 55% of countries today do not use conscription, up from 20% in 1970.<sup>64</sup>

While this is a preliminary result, it does suggest that in the developed world, conscription has fallen out of favor. Even France, inventor of mass conscription, has suspended the practice. There are likely more than one cause to this trend, including the expense of arming, housing, training, and feeding large armies during relative peace-time. The decreasing popularity of wars since 1945 — Levi shows that among U.S. audiences Korea was less popular than WWII, and Vietnam less popular still — also plays a role. But another likely cause is the growing sense that conscription is an overreach of state power. This objection is evident in expanded and inclusive policies for conscientious objection.

Where opposition to conscription is framed as a human rights issue (as opposed to an economic rights issue), the focus tends to be on conscientious objection. War Resisters International is the primary advocacy organization opposing conscription by promoting conscientious objection as a human right. The Council of Europe adopted one of the first statements by an IGO in support of conscientious objection, but this was non-binding; the United Nations Commission on Human Rights recognized a right to conscientious objection in 1987, and only in 2000 was the right included in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.<sup>65</sup> Of course, in the growing number of countries in which conscription has been abandoned, the right to conscientious objection is moot: the state no longer asserts a claim to compel military service.

States which no longer use conscription might be less able to extract the manpower necessary to maintain a military operation against an adversary nation. This possibility should factor into decisions to use military force, leading to a diminished likelihood of the use of force in military affairs.

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64 Hall, Joshua C (2011). "The Worldwide Decline in Conscription: A Victory for Economics" *Library of Economics and Liberty*; Featured Article (October 3, 2011). <http://www.econlib.org/library/Columns/y2011/Hallconscription.html>

65 Stolwijk, Marc (2005). "The Right to Conscientious Objection in Europe: A Review of the Current Situation", p. I-II available at: <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/42b141794.pdf>

*Hypothesis 5: Governments which have abolished conscription are less likely to enter into military disputes.*

The relationship between human rights, conscription, and force implies the following steps:

1. Governments with strong HRI agendas oppose conscription (or else diminish the burden of conscript service in terms of duration and risk).
2. Abolishing or limiting conscription then decreases the governments ability to recruit and sustain a large military in peacetime.
3. Policymakers and military leaders are aware of the decreased capability of their military, and factor that into their decisions conflict behavior, tending to refrain from use of military force.

Two recent studies suggest that the complementary hypothesis is correct: conscript armies are more likely to be put to use.<sup>66</sup> Other studies implicitly assume conscript armies are less likely to be used; the Correlates of War project provides a variable (not used here) called 'troop quality', which "divides COW data for annual military expenditures by COW data on the number of military personnel in a country"; several studies assume "that decision makers with high-quality soldiers stand more chance of dispatching them on belligerent missions [...] than counterparts with low quality troops".<sup>67</sup> Conscript armies tend to be larger, but cheaper per soldier, therefore lower quality by COW definitions. Another study, employing an interaction term, shows that democracies with conscription suffer fewer casualties in war than democracies with volunteer armies, but allows that democracies with conscription might be more likely to enter into conflict in the first place.<sup>68</sup>

The potential interaction between conscription is important because there may also be a countervailing mechanism at work, by which countries with conscription have a large number of

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66 Choi, Seung-Whan and Patrick James (2003). "No Professional Soldiers, No Militarized Disputes? A new question for Neo-Kantianism". *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 47:6 (December), pp. 796-816; Pickering, Jeffery (2011). "Dangerous Drafts? A Time-Series, Cross-National Analysis of Conscription and the Use of Military Force, 1946-2001". *Armed Forces & Society* 37:1, pp. 119-140

67 Pickering, Jeffery (2011). "Dangerous Drafts: A Time-Series, Cross-National Analysis of Conscription and the Use of Military Force, 1946-2001." *Armed Forces and Society* 37:1, p. 127

68 Vazquez III, Joseph Paul (2005). "Shouldering the Soldiering: Democracy, Conscription, and Military Casualties." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 49:6 (December 2005), p. 855

citizens with a learned aversion to use of military force; a study of the U.S. shows that a higher proportion of elected federal officials with military experience in leads to a decline in likelihood of use of force, but an increase in severity of force when used.<sup>69</sup> In the analysis stage (below), the interaction between democracy and conscription is a control variable.

### 3. Quantitative Analysis

This chapter presents a large-N analysis of the key research question: does observation of human rights at home correspond to decreased likelihood of use of force abroad?

#### 3.a Dependent variable

Dependent variable data will be drawn from the Correlates of War datasets on militarized interstate disputes (MID), covering the period 1816-2001.<sup>70</sup> These datasets include observations of whether force was used, and whether any fatalities occurred — the two are not always coterminous — and whether the country was an initiator or target in the dispute. Human-rights-observant states should be less likely to initiate use of force than repressive states, but may be more likely to be targets. This analysis will look first at use of force, then at initiator-target dynamics. In all cases, I drop ongoing dispute-years; this is demonstrably more accurate in identifying the effects of the decision to use force in a given dispute.<sup>71</sup>

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69 Gelpi, Christopher and Peter D. Feaver (2002). "Speak Softly and Carry a Big Stick? Veterans in the Political Elite and the American Use of Force." *American Political Science Review* 96:4 (December), pp. 779-793.

70 Ghosn, Faten, Glenn Palmer, and Stuart Bremer (2004). "The MID3 Data Set, 1993–2001: Procedures, Coding Rules, and Description." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 21:133-154.

71 Bennett, D. Scott and Allan C. Stam (2000). "Research Design and Estimator Choices in the Analysis of Interstate Dyads: When Decisions Matter". *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 44:5 (October), pp. 660-662. Henderson, Errol (2002). *Democracy and War: the end of an illusion?* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner), pp. 33

H1. For hypothesis 1, the relevant dataset is that on participant-level disputes (MIDb), containing 5602 observations (some disputes involve more than one country), with coding for a number of potentially relevant variables: "Fatality", whether any deaths occurred in the dispute according to a six point arbitrary interval scale; "FatalPre", the precise number of fatalities where known; "HiAct", the highest action in a dispute according to a 21-point ordinal scale ranging from "0 - No Militarized Action" to "21 - Join Interstate War"; and "HostLev", hostility level of the dispute according to a five point ordinal scale: "1 - No Militarized Action", "2 - Threat to Use Force", "3 - Display of Force", "4 - Use of Force", and "5-War".<sup>72</sup>

Since my ultimate concern is war, 'HostLev' should be an appropriate choice for a dependent variable. However, this puts the proposal at the mercy of the coding decisions made by the CoW project. Of the 4,978 observations with data on Fatality, 1,344 report no (0) fatalities but are also coded as "4 - Use of Force" for 'HostLev'. Only 841 observations have both non-zero levels of 'Fatality' and a "4 - Use of Force" or higher in 'HostLev'. Another 536 observations coded "4 - Use of Force" or higher report missing data for 'Fatality' and 'FatalPre'. The coding decisions are not transparent for data pre-1993, making it difficult to understand how use of force could be significant without any fatalities, and how that is different from show of force. For example, MID #2865 records what is colloquially known as the "First Cod War" between Iceland and the United Kingdom in 1958, during which shots were fired in warning, vessels were boarded, but no damage was deliberately incurred on either disputants' forces (except for a probably accidental collision between two ships).<sup>73</sup> This sort of situation poses a dilemma for this project, in that while both sides were apparently prepared to use lethal force against one another, no deliberate injuries were inflicted on either side.

Rather than take one variable as *the* correct choice for dependent variable, the disparities

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72 Ghosn, Fatin and Glenn Palmer (2003). "Codebook for the Militarized Interstate Dispute Data, Version 3.0". The Correlates of War 2 Project, Pennsylvania State University. <http://cow2.la.psu.edu>

73 Johannesson, Gudni Thorlacius (2004). "How 'cod war' came: The origins of the Anglo-Icelandic fisheries dispute, 1958-61". *Historical Research* 77:198 (November 2004) pp. 543-574.

between 'Fatality' and 'HostLev' can be seen as a lower and upper bounds, respectively, on what constitutes actual force in international affairs. 'Fatality' serves as the lower (i.e. more restrictive) bound because the use of force is attested by actual death. 'HostLev' as the upper (less restrictive) bound, because it allows for situations in which force was used without lethal effect.

H2. Dyadic data are available from COW (MID-Dyadic) only for the period 1993 to present. Dispute-level data (MIDa) cover the same countries and disputes as MIDb, with an indicator as to the originator of the dispute. Dyadic data derived from MIDb (and preserving the original variables and coding) are available for the period 1816 to 1993 from EUGene.<sup>74</sup> Because the primary period of interest in this project is 1946 to 2001, dyadic data will come from a synthesis of EUGene and current MID-Dyadic data

Hypothesis 2 posits HRI-observant states will be less likely to escalate a conflict regardless of whether they are the initiators or targets of a dispute. Because H2 focuses on escalation, HiAct is a better choice for a dependent variable than HostLevel or Fatality, allowing for more discrepancy between the two states party to the dispute (across the 21-point scale). However, there is a difference between the MIDa and MIDb datasets in their coding of HiAct. Of the 4996 observations coded in the MIDb (participant-level) dataset as 'originator', 1336 (26.7%) are coded as HiAct = "0 - No militarized action"; of the 2233 observations in MIDa (dispute level), *none* are coded as Hi-Act = "0" and only 672 (30.1%) do not rise to the level of "Use of Force".<sup>75</sup> COW data collections likely have a bias towards circumstances involving the use of force, but it is not evident whether that bias will have detrimental

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74 Bennett, D. Scott, and Allan Stam. 2000. "EUGene: A Conceptual Manual." *International Interactions* 26:179-204. Website: <http://eugenesoftware.org>.

75 For comparison purposes, the ICB dataset has 455 observations of 'crises' between 1918 and 2001; of these, 184 are coded as 'no violence' (40%). The MID dispute level dataset for the same period show 1892 observations, of which 496 are coded as not involving use of force (26%). Around 75% of crises can be matched to an observation in the MID dataset. Confusingly, the standards for "crisis" are more stringent than those for militarized interstate disputes: "Even when there is a use of force in an interstate confrontation, the conditions for international crisis do not necessarily exist." Hewitt, J. Joseph (2003). "Dyadic Processes and International Crises". *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 47:5 (Oct.), p. 681



consequences for this analysis. In any case, the directed-dispute data, which derive from the MIDb dataset, will be less biased in favor of militarized action. Hypothesis 2 will be tested with duplicate dyads, because each state has a separate decision to escalate: US vs. UK 1812 represents one decision, and UK vs. US 1812 another decision regarding escalation.

H3. The participant-level dataset (MIDb) includes a variable, 'Orig', indicating whether the state was an originator (or initiator) of the dispute. This can be used to construct directed-dyad data (available in part from COW and EUGene). In the directed-dyad, the pairwise relationship of interest is specifically initiator to target. Because the focus in hypothesis 3 is on the initiator of the dispute, the dyads should be directed: US vs. UK 1812 is only counted if the US is coded as the originator of the dispute.

### 3.b. Independent Variable

H1. The first independent variable tested will be the CIRI dataset on (<http://ciri.binghamton.edu/>) on Physical Integrity Rights Index (PIRI), covering the period 1981 to 2004, as derived from the U.S. Department of State's human rights reporting.<sup>76</sup> This follows from the work of Sobek *et al.* (2006), who focused on dyadic — ie 'joint' — effects of human rights practices, where this hypotheses focuses on monadic effects. That is, the theory described in the previous chapter predicts that the state will be constrained even if its opponent is not observant of human rights. The CIRI-PIRI — or 'PhysInt' — records observations from 0 to 8, and is an additive index constructed from four specific indicators: Torture, Extrajudicial Killing, Political Imprisonment, and Disappearance.<sup>77</sup> These data will be modified as needed for the further hypotheses (below).

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<sup>76</sup> CIRI Human Rights Data Project; <http://ciri.binghamton.edu/>

<sup>77</sup> Cingranelli, David L. and David L. Richards (2008). "Short Variable Descriptions for Indicators in the CIRI (Cingranelli-Richards) Human Rights Dataset". [http://ciri.binghamton.edu/documentation/ciri\\_variables\\_short\\_descriptions.pdf](http://ciri.binghamton.edu/documentation/ciri_variables_short_descriptions.pdf)

There are two limitations on the CIRI dataset: it extends back only to 1981, and is subject to potential bias from the U.S. government's foreign agenda. However, there are other data available on specific human rights practices, such as capital punishment. A further step in the analysis will be to test those data against the dependent variable; this may require some adaptation of existing datasets. Potential datasets include Amnesty International data on capital punishment, Polity data on extra-judicial killing and other rights violations, and Freedom House data on political rights.

H2. Because Hypothesis 2 involves state interactions, analysis requires at least an independent variable for the joint-HRI observance. However, a model built around that variable would likely be underspecified — that is, the PhysInt scores for each of the states would constitute omitted variables — so it is also important to include independent measures for the HRI status of each state;  $HRI_A$  and  $HRI_B$ . These will be based on the CIRI PIRI dataset, with  $HRI_J$  as a multiplicative interaction term.

Hypothesis 2 implies only that the interaction term will have a more negative effect on escalation propensity the higher it becomes: that is, two countries with high  $HRI_A$  and  $HRI_B$  respectively will also have a high  $HRI_J$ . In the case of two non-observant countries,  $HRI_A$ ,  $HRI_B$ , and  $HRI_J$  will all be low. Incidentally, it is necessary to add 1 point to all HRI scores, in order to ensure the interaction term  $HRI_J$  is not zero whenever one or the other country rates a 0 for HRI. That is, there should still be a meaningful difference between a pair of countries ranked 0 and 8 respectively on the PIRI scale, and a pair ranked 0 and 1 respectively. The scale for  $HRI_J$  ranges from from 1 to 81.

H3. Hypothesis 3 likewise involves state interactions, but here these interactions are directed. The respective PIRI scores for the initiator and target will be  $HRI_I$  and  $HRI_T$ , with the interaction term remain  $HRI_J$ . However, the implication in this hypothesis is that directionality of the difference between the two scores is important; regarding a similar implication in the democratic peace literature, Bennett

constructs an interaction term for directed-dyad joint democracy as follows:

$$[(\text{Dem}_{\text{Initiator}} + 10) * (20 - |\text{Dem}_{\text{Initiator}} - \text{Dem}_{\text{Target}}|)]$$

The variable is constructed in this manner to account for the fact that the Polity IV data are scaled -10 to 10, and to ensure that the variable "is consistently higher for more similar states and more democratic initiators.<sup>78</sup> Because the modified CIRI-PIRI scale is 1 to 9, this allows a more somewhat simpler construction:

$$\text{HRI}_D = [(\text{HRI}_I) * (9 - |\text{HRI}_I - \text{HRI}_T|)]$$

For example, an initiator-target pair with HRI of 2 and 9 respectively would score  $2 * (9 - |2 - 9|) = 4$ , while an initiator-target pair with HRI scores of 9 and 2 respectively would score  $1 * (9 - |1 - 1|) = 18$ .

The highest possible score on this scale would be for two perfectly HRI countries,  $\text{HRI}_D = 81$ , and the score for two perfectly HRI-violative countries  $\text{HRI}_D = 9$ . The lowest possible score on this scale is for a country with HRI score 1 attacking a country with HRI score 9:  $1 * (9 - |1 - 9|) = 1$ .

### 3.c. Control Variables

Previous literature has identified a number of factors which make states more likely to use force, both in monad and dyad. The most important of these for the present argument is whether the regime is democratic—that is, although democracies are more likely to have strong human rights records, the constraints posed by human rights ideals are not due solely to democracy.

H1. In monadic analysis, the important control variable is regime type (Dem), drawn from the Polity IV dataset. The dataset covers 164 countries from the period 1800 to 2010, and scores each from -10 to

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<sup>78</sup> Bennett, D. Scott (2006). "Towards a Continuous Specification of the Democracy-Autocracy Connection". *International Studies Quarterly* 50:2 (June), p. 322

10 according to a composite measure of governance authority — from 'fully institutionalized autocracy to fully institutionalized democracy'.<sup>79</sup> Polity data on regime types have the benefit of not deriving from measures of civil or political liberties (unlike Freedom House data), but instead focus more closely on institutional characteristics of democratic and autocratic governance.<sup>80</sup> This gives greater conceptual separation between democratic governance and human rights observance, and allows for a clearer test of the difference between the two.

Other controls for monadic analysis attested in the literature include transition, militarization, development, downturn, major power.<sup>81</sup> Transition (Trans) data are derived from the Polity IV dataset as the difference in a country's regime score from the previous year to the current year. Development (Dev) is the log of the ratio of the state's energy consumption to its total population; Militarization (Mil) is the log of the ratio of the state's military personnel to its total populations. Both are based on data available in the COW National Material Capabilities (v4.0) dataset.

Downturn (Down) is coded as 1 "in cases where the annual percentage in *Development* is negative for three consecutive years, and '0' otherwise".<sup>82</sup> Major power (MajPow) is a variable coded in the COW MID datasets as 0 or 1. Civilization group (Civ) is available from the classification schedule developed by Russett, Oneal, and Cox.<sup>83</sup>

H2 & 3. For dyadic analysis, the relative democracy of each dyad member is an important control, just as it is in monadic analysis. Also important is an interaction for the two states' joint democracy. This

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79 Polity IV (2012). Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions 1800-2010. <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm>

80 Marshall, Monty; Keith Jagers; and Ted Gurr (2010). Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2010, Dataset User's Manual. Center for Systemic Peace, pp. 18-28 <http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p4manualv2010.pdf>

81 For transition, major power, militarization, development, and downturn, see Henderson, Errol (2002). *Democracy and War: the end of an illusion?* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner), pp. 59-61

82 Henderson, Errol (2002). *Democracy and War: the end of an illusion?* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner), pp. 60-39

83 Russett, Bruce M.; John R. Oneal; and Michaelene Cox (2000). "Clash of Civilizations, or Realism and Liberalism Déjà Vu? Some Evidence". *Journal of Peace Research* 37:5 (September). pp. 591-592, appendix.

has been modeled in the literature in a number of ways: as a multiplicative interaction term, an additive combination, as the lower of the two, or their geometric mean. One study comparing all four methods has found them comparable.<sup>84</sup> The most straightforward way, used here, is to include democracy scores for state A ( $Dem_A$ ) and state B ( $Dem_B$ ), plus an interaction term  $Dem_I = (Dem_A) * (Dem_B)$ . Because Polity scores range from -10 to 10, the interaction term is not, in fact, for joint democracy, but for regime similarity: that is, a pair of absolute democracies and a pair of absolute autocracies will both have scores of 100 — in line with predictions in the democratic peace literature that regime dissimilarity is the relevant consideration. For the directed-dyadic analysis in H3, Bennett's interaction term (described above) will be included to account for the directed nature of the dyad:  $Dem_D = [(Dem_I + 10) * (20 - |Dem_I - Dem_T|)]$ .

Dyadic models should also include measures of alliance, balance of forces, balance of forces squared, trade between the countries, and major power: these are all attested in the literature and theoretically important to our understanding of conflict and war.<sup>85</sup>

For control variables, the the following datasets are available from the Correlates of War Project:

- Alliance: Formal Alliances (v3.03) covers all states from 1816-2000, recording their alliances on a three-point ordinal scale.<sup>86</sup>

- Balance of forces (Balance), balance of forces squared (Balance<sup>2</sup>): National Material Capabilities (v4.0) dataset includes measures of "total population, urban population, iron and steel

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84 Henderson, Errol (2002). *Democracy and War: the end of an illusion?* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner), p. 33-39

85 For alliance, balance of forces, status quo, contiguity, civilization group, see Kim, Hyung Min and David L. Rosseau (2005) "The Classical Liberals Were Half Right (of Half Wrong): New Tests of the Liberal Peace." *Journal of Peace Research* 42:5 (September), pp. 524-526. For trade ratio, see Henderson, Errol (2002). *Democracy and War: the end of an illusion?* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner), pp. 30-39. See also Maoz, Zeev and Bruce Russett (1993). "Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace, 1946-1986". *American Political Science Review* 87:3 (September), p. 631; Bennett, D. Scott (2006). "Towards a Continuous Specification of the Democracy-Autocracy Connection". *International Studies Quarterly* 50:2 (June), p. 326-327.

86 Gibler, Douglas M., and Meredith Sarkees. 2004. "Measuring Alliances: The Correlates of War Formal Interstate Alliance Data set, 1816-2000." *Journal of Peace Research* 41(2): 211-222.

production, energy consumption, military personnel, and military expenditure of all state members, currently from 1816-2007. The widely-used Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) index is based on these six variables and included in the data set".<sup>87</sup> Balance<sup>2</sup> allows for the relationship to be curvilinear; some theories hold that a significant disparity is safer than parity.

-Trade between the countries (Trade): Bilateral Trade (v.3) covers the period 1870-2009 for state pairs in current (i.e. 2009) US dollars.<sup>88</sup>

- Major power (MajPow) is coded in the Correlates of War datasets as a binary variable — 1 if the country is a major power that year, 0 if not.

The remaining control variable, for Different Civilization Group (DiffCiv), is coded as follows: "if the two states do not belong to the same civilization group, the variable different civilization group is coded 1; otherwise, it is coded 0".<sup>89</sup> DiffCiv is determined by the classification developed by Russett, Oneal, and Cox.<sup>90</sup>

### 3.d. Methods

Because the mechanisms and hypotheses of this project deliberately parallel those of the democratic peace literature, it is appropriate to look at the methodology used in that literature. There are, however, many different estimators used in various tests of the democratic peace. Logistic models are common,<sup>91</sup> probit sometimes used, and generalized estimator equations (GEE) also attested. An overview of the methods commonly used in the democratic peace literature suggests that a fixed-effects

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87 Singer, J. David, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey. (1972). "Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820-1965." in Bruce Russett (ed) *Peace, War, and Numbers*, Beverly Hills: Sage, 19-48.

88 Barbieri, Katherine and Omar Keshk. 2012. Correlates of War Project Trade Data Set Codebook, Version 3.0. Online: <http://correlatesofwar.org>.

89 Kim, Hyung Min and David L. Rosseau (2005) "The Classical Liberals Were Half Right (of Half Wrong): New Tests of the Liberal Peace." *Journal of Peace Research* 42:5 (September), pp. 531.

90 Russett, Bruce M.; John R. Oneal; and Michaelene Cox (2000). "Clash of Civilizations, or Realism and Liberalism Déjà Vu? Some Evidence". *Journal of Peace Research* 37:5 (September). pp. 591-592, appendix.

91 Henderson identifies logistic models as standard.

conditional logit model is "the best way to test arguments that imply a major role for time and change over time".<sup>92</sup> In particular, fixed-effects approaches allow for heterogeneity across units (dyads or states), rather than averaging all the units together as if they were identical. This is especially important to the present project, which does not at all assume similarity in the relevant policies across states or pairs of states. As an additional benefit, in fixed-effects estimation, "the odds ratio represents the odds of a democratic state initiating the use of force compared to the odds of an average nondemocracy using force," as opposed to the likelihood of use of force by the average democracy versus the average nondemocracy, as is the result in standard logit and GEE approaches.<sup>93</sup> Fixed-effects conditional logit estimation will be the primary empirical test used in this project; this approach is readily implemented in STATA with the `xtreg` and `xtlogit` syntax, and FE can be used both on monadic and dyadic data.<sup>94</sup>

Fixed-effects estimators (FE) have two potential drawbacks for this project: first, FE cannot estimate the effect of independent variables which do not vary over time for that unit; second, FE require dropping units where there is no variation on the dependent variable.<sup>95</sup> Although static characteristics of state relations — include measures of contiguity, enduring rivalry, and civilization grouping — are widely considered relevant to the origins of conflict, there are solid theoretical reasons to focus only on the dynamic aspects of international relations. For example, contiguity is an important consideration in so-called 'politically relevant dyads': states which are not contiguous are assumed to comprise an irrelevant dyad, unless one of state is a major power. Most dyadic studies of democratic peace use politically-relevant dyad-years as the basic observation unit, even though the vast majority of

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92 Bennett, D. Scott and Allan C. Stam (2000). "Research Design and Estimator Choices in the Analysis of Interstate Dyads: When Decisions Matter". *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 44:5 (October), p. 667.

93 Bennett, D. Scott and Allan C. Stam (2000). "Research Design and Estimator Choices in the Analysis of Interstate Dyads: When Decisions Matter". *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 44:5 (October), p. 665.

94 An alternative method which addresses some of the shortcomings of FE estimation is described in Bartels, Brandon (nd), "Beyond 'Fixed Versus Random Effects': A Framework for Improving Substantive and Statistical Analysis of Panel, Time-Series Cross-sectional, and Multilevel data", available online at: <http://home.gwu.edu/~bartels/cluster.pdf>. The methods described may be more appropriate to the aims of this project. I am open to counsel from the committee.

95 Bennett, D. Scott and Allan C. Stam (2000). "Research Design and Estimator Choices in the Analysis of Interstate Dyads: When Decisions Matter". *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 44:5 (October), p. 666-667.

dyad-years show no conflict at all. Many dyads show no conflict in any year, meaning a fixed-effects approach would ignore these observations as irrelevant. The premise of work based on politically-relevant dyads is that peace is the absence of conflict, that the ultimate goal of peace research is to identify the sources of interstate conflict and the possible methods for conflict prevention. As such, zero-conflict dyads are *most* interesting precisely for having the *least* amount of conflict. The problem with this work is that treating dyads which have not come into conflict as 'peaceful' assumes that to some extent the sources of peace are intrinsic and immutable to those specific dyads. As a pragmatic concern, such research might never be able to provide a meaningful remedy to the consequences of conflict; the factors which prevent a pair of states from conflict may be impossible to replicate for other pairs of states.

The present study makes the more modest claim that the potential for conflict is given in interstate relations, as it is in human relations more broadly; so the appropriate question is not, 'is conflict preventable?' but instead, 'is conflict resolvable, without recourse to violence?' In this context, the only politically-relevant dyads are those which experience significant conflict; significant in this sense means noted in the Correlates of War datasets, as discussed above. Fixed effects ignores exactly those factors which are idiosyncratic to the dyad, or otherwise unchangeable. Dyads which have not yet encountered significant conflict are irrelevant, because the factors which might make them peaceful despite significant conflict are yet untested. In this context, the limitations of fixed-effects approaches are no longer drawbacks; they require us to focus on those factors which are changeable for those states which experience conflict.



Models summary:

*Hypothesis 1: States which respect personal integrity rights are less likely to be involved in fatal militarized disputes than states which violate PIRs.*

Model 1a.    DV:    Fatality            Ordinal            COW(derived)  
                  IV:    PhysInt            Ordinal            CIRI

$$\Pr(\text{Fatality}_{it} = m \mid X_{it}) = F(\beta_1 \text{PhysInt}_{it} + \beta_2 \text{Dem}_{it} + \beta_3 \text{Trans}_{it} + \beta_4 \text{Dev}_{it} + \beta_5 \text{Mil}_{it} + \beta_6 \text{Down}_{it} + \beta_7 \text{MajPow}_{it})$$

Model 1b.    DV:    "FatalPre"        Count            COW  
                  IV:    "PhysInt"        Ordinal            CIRI

$$\Pr(\text{FatalPre}_{it} = n \mid X_{it}) = F(\beta_1 \text{PhysInt}_{it} + \beta_2 \text{Dem}_{it} + \beta_3 \text{Trans}_{it} + \beta_4 \text{Dev}_{it} + \beta_5 \text{Mil}_{it} + \beta_6 \text{Down}_{it} + \beta_7 \text{MajPow}_{it})$$

Model 1c.    DV:    "HostLev"        Ordinal            COW  
                  IV:    "PhysInt"        Ordinal            CIRI(derived)

$$\Pr(\text{HostLev}_{it} = m \mid X_{it}) = F(\beta_1 \text{PhysInt}_{it} + \beta_2 \text{Dem}_{it} + \beta_3 \text{Trans}_{it} + \beta_4 \text{Dev}_{it} + \beta_5 \text{Mil}_{it} + \beta_6 \text{Down}_{it} + \beta_7 \text{MajPow}_{it})$$

*note: all models monadic*

*Hypothesis 2: States which respect personal integrity rights are less likely to escalate military disputes against states which also respect PIRs, and more likely to escalate against states which do not respect PIRs.*

Model 2.    DV:    "HiAct"            Count            COW  
                  IV:    HRI<sub>I</sub>, HRI<sub>T</sub>, HRI<sub>J</sub>    Ordinal            CIRI(derived)

$$\Pr(\text{HiAct}_{it} = m \mid X_{it}) = F(\beta_1 \text{HRI}_{I,it} + \beta_2 \text{HRI}_{T,it} + \beta_3 \text{HRI}_{J,it} + \beta_4 \text{Dem}_{A,it} + \beta_5 \text{Dem}_{B,it} + \beta_6 \text{Dem}_{J,it} + \beta_7 \text{Alliance}_{it} + \beta_8 \text{Balance}_{it} + \beta_9 \text{Balance}^2_{it} + \beta_{10} \text{Trade}_{it} + \beta_{11} \text{MajPow}_{it})$$

*Hypothesis 3: States which do not respect personal integrity rights are more likely to initiate militarized disputes against states which do respect PIRs.*

Model 3.    DV:    "Orig"            Ordinal            COW  
                  IV:    HRI<sub>I</sub>, HRI<sub>T</sub>, HRI<sub>J</sub>, HRI<sub>D</sub>    Ordinal            CIRI(derived)

$$\Pr(\text{Orig}_{it} = 1 \mid X_{it}) = F(\beta_1 \text{HRI}_{I,it} + \beta_2 \text{HRI}_{T,it} + \beta_3 \text{HRI}_{J,it} + \beta_4 \text{HRI}_{D,it} + \beta_5 \text{Dem}_{A,it} + \beta_6 \text{Dem}_{B,it} + \beta_7 \text{Dem}_{J,it} + \beta_8 \text{Dem}_{D,it} + \beta_9 \text{Alliance}_{it} + \beta_{10} \text{Balance}_{it} + \beta_{11} \text{Balance}^2_{it} + \beta_{12} \text{Trade}_{it} + \beta_{13} \text{MajPow}_{it})$$

#### 4. Mechanism: Party Platforms and Ideology of Force

This chapter assesses the relevance of party platforms to human rights ideals and the use of military force. For each test of the relationship between the proposed mechanism and the dispute outcome variables, the mechanism should provide a somewhat weaker correlation than the more general HRI variables. That is, if HRI affects the use of force through more than one mechanism, no mechanism should by itself be as strong as or stronger than the total effect of HRI.

##### 4.a. Dependent Variable

The principal dependent variables are 'Fatality' and 'HostLev', as described above.

##### 4.b. Independent Variable

The key independent variable for this hypothesis is the expressed HRI of the party in power in each country, 'RulPartyHRI' for 'ruling party human rights ideals'. The Manifesto Project compiles party platforms from elections across 50 countries beginning in 1945.<sup>96</sup> For each party platform, the datasets represent the content according to a number of variables, many of which are relevant to this project. One variable, 'Freedom and Human Rights' is the obvious candidate for an independent variable in this analysis. The Manifesto Project codes each variable for the percentage of content in the platform given over to that specific variable, which standardizes the indicator on a continuous scale from 0 to 1. For example, in the 2008 US Federal election the Democratic Party platform had 1.8% content on Freedom and Human Rights; for the two years from 2009 and 2010, RulPartyHRI for the US would be coded as .018.

The Manifesto Project does not provide clear information on which parties control government.

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<sup>96</sup> Volkens, Andrea; Onawa Lacewell; Pola Lehmann; Sven Regel; Henrike Schultze; and Annika Werner (2012). *The Manifesto Data Collection*. Manifesto Project (MRG/CMP/MARPOR) Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB), available here: <https://manifestoproject.wzb.eu/>

This is important to assign the correct ideology for each country in a given year. However, data on election results and parliamentary bodies is available from the Inter-Parliamentary Union for "266 parliamentary chambers in all of the 190 countries where a national legislature exists".<sup>97</sup> Data are available as far back as 1968 for some countries.

Generally, which party is 'power' is determined by control of parliament. However, many countries have two bodies comprising their parliament, and some countries — such as the U.S. — elect an executive separately from the parliament, leading to the possibility of different parties in control of different parts of the government. My model should account for the possibility that a divided government would prevent the majority in parliament from putting the platform into policy. It is thus appropriate to include a variable concerning whether government is divided or not, 'UniGov', where UniGov = 1 indicates a united government, and UniGov = 0 a divided government. In 2010, the Republican Party won control of the U.S. House of Representatives, but not the Senate; the Republican Party did not formulate a platform in 2010. Thus, for the period 2011-2012, the US RulPartyHRI is coded as .004, reflecting the 0.4% content on 'Freedom and Human Rights' in their 2008 platform; the US is also coded as UniGov = 0, indicating a divided government.<sup>98</sup>

#### 4.c. Control Variables

The monadic set of control variables (described above) applies for the estimation of the effects of RulPartyHRI on "Fatality" and "HostLev". An additional control variable based on the Manifesto Project category "Military: Positive" (RulParMil) — constructed similarly to the RulParHRI variable — will test whether ruling party attitudes towards the military are a better indicator of propensity to force than their attitudes towards human rights.

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97 IPU. "PARLINE database on national parliaments". <http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/parlinesearch.asp>

98 When the Senate and House are both controlled by the same party, and the Presidency by the other, UniGov = 0 as well; the rule applies to all governments with possible division between houses or branches.

#### 4.d. Methods

The first step in analysis of this data is whether these variables do in fact correlate in meaningful ways. This analysis would be run across the entire dataset, with the expectation that 'Freedom and Human Rights', 'Peace', and 'Anti-Imperialism' should be correlated positively, and inversely correlated to 'Military: Positive' and 'Law & Order: Positive'. This would affirm the basic premise of the mechanism: that parties tend to have internally consistent positions with respect to human rights and the use of force in domestic and foreign affairs. Although platforms often borrow ideas from previous iterations, each platform can be taken a separate observation. The resulting data set can be analyzed by a simple McNemar's Test of the variables, to determine whether they are correlated.

The next step is to confirm that high scores for 'RulPartyHRI' translate into actual observance of HRI. This can be done by testing (via FE estimation or similar) that variable lagged by one year against PIRI from the CIRI dataset, to determine whether platforms result in policy changes following elections. This can also be done for other relevant variables with clear policy outcomes. For example, 'Military: positive' can be tested against increased in military spending; in countries with active military conflict, 'Peace' can be tested against termination of those conflicts. As a comparison, the unrelated domestic platform position "Welfare State Expansion" will also be tested against data on social expenditure; however, the best available dataset only covers OECD countries from the period 1980 to 2012.<sup>99</sup> There may be additional data available for certain OECD members as far back as 1960. To provide a comparison of foreign policy consequences of platforms, the variable "Internationalism: positive" can be tested against data on foreign aid; a dataset available from the Center for Global Development reports total donor 'Net Aid Transfers' for OECD donor countries from 1960 to present.<sup>100</sup>

There is a potential problem in this approach where 'Freedom and Human Rights' is the central

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<sup>99</sup> OECD (2012). Social Expenditure Database (SOCX).

<http://www.oecd.org/els/familiesandchildren/socialspendituredatabasesocx.htm>

<sup>100</sup>Roodman, David (2010). Net Aid Transfers Dataset (1960-2010).

HRI component in 'RulePartyHRI': parties in countries where HRI are firmly embedded in government and society may devote little attention to commitment to same, taking their observance of HRI as granted. Parties in countries with strong protections against violations of personal integrity rights are not likely to promise not to violate rights already strongly protected, nor to advocate for their future violation: "Vote for us, and we won't bring back slavery" is not a likely campaign slogan. A possible solution is to look at other, related indicators, which are more controversial in these societies but also speak to concerns addressed in HRI.

If 'Freedom and Human Rights' is not a reliable indicator of where governments actually stand on relevant HRI, there are two possible ways to continue. One is to assemble, based on the previous results, a composite indicator including other related variables, and to incorporate that into 'RulePartyHRI'. Second is to switch to a confirmatory factor analysis model, which might produce latent variable from related indicators in the Manifesto Project. The first option seems preferable, but the second may prove more appropriate.<sup>101</sup> Ideally, neither will be necessary.

The final step is to test 'RulePartyHRI' against militarized dispute involvement by FE estimation (or similar). This draws on data from the COW project described above as dependent variables.

The theoretical discussion of the connection between party platforms and military force described four steps as necessary to complete the mechanism, which this methodology addresses as follows:

1. *A political party drafts a manifesto which include specific statements regarding HRI: captured by the variable 'RulPartyHRI'.*
2. *The policy platform is consistent with respect to the state's use of force, so that strong HRI advocacy is not associated with imperialist expansion or militarism: assessed by comparison of other variables in the party's platform.*
3. *The electorate has to favor this party — not necessarily because of its position on HRI — and deliver it to power: captured in part by 'RulPartyHRI', in part by 'UniGov'.*

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<http://www.cgdev.org/content/publications/detail/5492/>  
101I am, of course, open to the counsel of the committee on this question.

4. *The party, once in power, is able to implement policy based to some degree on its platform:* assessed by testing 'RulPartyHRI' against HRI outcomes, as well as 'Military: positive' against increased in military spending; 'Peace' against conflict termination; "Welfare State Expansion" against data on social expenditure; and "Internationalism: positive" against data on foreign aid.

Model Summary:

*Hypothesis 4: Ruling parties whose platforms emphasize HRI are more likely to protect human rights and less likely to enter into military disputes.*

Model 4a.    DV: "Fatality"                    Binary                    COW(derived)  
                   IV: "RulPartyHRI"                    Continuous

$$\Pr (\text{Fatality}_{it} = m \mid X_{it}) = F (\beta_1 \text{RulPartyHRI}_{it-1} + \beta_2 \text{RulParMil}_{it} + \beta_3 \text{UniGov}_{it-1} + \beta_4 \text{Dem}_{it} + \beta_5 \text{Trans}_{it} + \beta_6 \text{Dev}_{it} + \beta_7 \text{Mil}_{it} + \beta_8 \text{Down}_{it} + \beta_9 \text{MajPow}_{it})$$

Model 4b.    DV: "HostLev"                    Ordinal                    COW  
                   IV: "RulPartyHRI"                    Continuous

$$\Pr (\text{HostLev}_{it} = m \mid X_{it}) = F (\beta_1 \text{RulPartyHRI}_{it-1} + \beta_2 \text{RulParMil}_{it-1} + \beta_3 \text{UniGov}_{it-1} + \beta_4 \text{Dem}_{it} + \beta_5 \text{Trans}_{it} + \beta_6 \text{Dev}_{it} + \beta_7 \text{Mil}_{it} + \beta_8 \text{Down}_{it} + \beta_9 \text{MajPow}_{it})$$

#### 4.e. Further Analysis

The quantitative analysis in this section will be supplemented by brief case studies of party politics with respect to their implementation of human rights policies. The goal of the case studies will be trace each step in the mechanism as described above; as such, the qualitative analysis is intended to be illustrative, not definitive.

## 5. Mechanism: Conscription

This chapter analyzes the relationship between resource extraction through conscription, human rights ideals, and use of military force.

### 5.a. Dependent Variable

The principal dependent variables are 'Fatality' and 'HostLev', as described above.

### 5.b. Independent Variables

Data on conscription and conscientious objection policies for various states are available from War Resisters International; I have combined this data into a single dataset with a binary variable for conscription policy: "1" indicates that conscription is actively used to recruit troops; "0" indicates that conscription is abolished, suspended, or not enforced. The dataset also includes variables for the dates of changes in conscription policy, as well as notes about the nature of the change. Another dataset on conscription (and other economic freedoms) is available from the Fraser Institute's *Economic Freedom of the World* project;<sup>102</sup> these data are coded according to a possibly spurious scale, by which

Countries without conscription receive a score of ten, while countries with conscription receive a score less than ten. The longer the period for which people are conscripted, the lower is the country's rating. So, countries in which the length of conscription is less than six months receive a rating of five, while countries with conscription lengths between six and twelve months earn a three. When the term of conscription is between twelve and eighteen months, a country earns a one, and countries with conscription periods greater than eighteen months receive a zero.<sup>103</sup>

This could easily be reduced to a binary scheme, where '10's are 0s and everything else coded as 1.

Minimal additional data collection is necessary to permit adequate analysis of conscription policies.

Because COW data are coded upon actual entry into the war, and not the decision to enter war,

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<sup>102</sup>Fraser Institute. "Economic Freedom of the World 2012 Annual Report". <http://www.freetheworld.com/release.html>

<sup>103</sup>Hall, Joshua C (2011). "The Worldwide Decline in Conscription: A Victory for Economics" Library of Economics and Liberty; Featured Article (October 3, 2011). <http://www.econlib.org/library/Columns/y2011/Hallconscription.html>

and it is likely that the decision to go to war spurs a recruitment drive prior to the initiation of conflict, the use of entry into war creates an endogeneity problem for the model: in some countries, conscription can be activated when the country is at war, or war is imminent. To avoid that problem, indicators for conscription will be lagged by two years — on the assumption that the military power a government has two years prior to a conflict is not as likely to be influenced by the decision to go to war as the military it has the same year hostilities commence. For example, the U.S. Army had nearly 180,000 Army soldiers in 1937, 186,000 soldiers in 1938, 190,000 soldiers in 1939, 270,000 soldiers in 1940 — almost half again its 1939 ranks — and then 1.5 million soldiers in 1941.<sup>104</sup> The recruitment increase in 1940 is likely due to anticipated involvement in the conflict — even if only to protect American neutrality — despite the US not being formally 'at war' until the end of 1941. The US in World War II provides a plausible model for how long it takes policymakers assessing the potential for their government to be involved in war to adjust recruitment policies accordingly.

### 5.c. Control Variables

The monadic set of control variables (described above) applies. Especially important is the variable militarization (Mil), which represents the ratio of military personnel to total population. This indicator has been shown to have a positive, significant effect on countries' propensity to use military force. Most countries with large militaries use conscription to ensure their military strength. However, military personnel counts show some inertia; conscripts must finish their terms of service, and some conscripts might re-enlist who would never join the military in the first place. There should be a strong but not perfect correlation between militarization and conscription, with the difference allowing for a meaningful test. This project will examine the correlation between the two in greater detail.

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<sup>104</sup>Thompson, Garry L. (2002). "Army Downsizing Following World War I, World War II, Vietnam, and a Comparison to Recent Army Downsizing." (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas), p. 93.  
available at: <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA415899>



## 5.d. Methods

The central test of hypothesis 5 can be done readily with FE estimation or similar, using the above-described variables. Building on previous studies of conscription, I include an interaction term for conscription and democracy, to account for the popular theory that a democracy whose members are liable to die in war is less likely to use military force to resolve disputes.

Further analysis of the mechanism requires a series of steps; first, identifying a correlation between HRI and conscription. Because of the work done in the previous chapter, the most straightforward approach to this question is by testing conscription against 'RulPartyHRI' from the Manifesto Project dataset. In this test, 'RulPartyMil' will again be an important control variable. It is also important to control for changes in economic capacity: some countries may abolish conscription simply because large armies are too expensive. The control variables, 'Dev' and 'Down' described above account for the economic circumstances of conscription abolition. A further control should include MID involvement in the last five years (MID5); countries which feel threatened should not be as likely to abolish conscription. Estimation can be done by a FE logit estimation, with the assumption of policy continuity within countries apart from changes in HRI and conscription:

$$\Pr (\text{Conscription}_{it} = 0 \mid X_{it}) = F (\beta_1 \text{RulPartyHRI}_{it-1} + \beta_2 \text{RulParMil}_{it} + \beta_3 \text{Dev}_{it} + \beta_4 \text{Down}_{it} + \beta_5 \text{MID5})$$

If it is instead reasonable to assume that each government represents a new observation, this estimation could be performed more simply with ordinary logistic regression, where each new 'RulPartyHRI' is regressed on the binary variable for conscription to test whether party support for HRI translates into abolition of conscription.

$$\Pr (\text{Conscription}_i = 0 \mid X_i) = F (\beta_1 \text{RulPartyHRI}_i + \beta_2 \text{RulParMil}_i + \beta_3 \text{Dev}_i + \beta_4 \text{Down}_i + \beta_5 \text{MID5}_i )$$

The next step is to determine whether restrictions on conscription reduce the governments' ability to recruit and sustain strong militaries. This can be accomplished by testing whether the control variable, militarization ('Milit' — described above), changes significantly after conscription is abolished. Specifically, militarization should be significantly less where conscription is abolished. Again, this requires control variables for economic status, democracy (and interaction), and recent threat status.

$$\Pr(\text{Milit}_{it} = 0 \mid X_{it}) = F(\beta_1 \text{Conscription}_{it-1} + \beta_2 \text{Dem}_{it} + \beta_3 \text{Dem}_{it} * \text{Conscription}_{it} + \beta_4 \text{Dev}_{it} + \beta_5 \text{Down}_{it} + \beta_6 \text{MID5})$$

The connection between militarization and use of force has been previously established in the literature,<sup>105</sup> and is tested above in chapter 3 where militarization is used as a control variable.

Where the theoretical discussion of conscription, human rights, and military force established three steps in the mechanism, those steps have been addressed as follows:

1. *Governments with strong HRI agendas oppose conscription (or else diminish the burden of conscript service in terms of duration and risk).* Assessed partially by testing HRI against conscription abolition — see qualitative section to follow.
2. *Abolishing or limiting conscription then decreases the governments ability to recruit and sustain a large military in peacetime.* Assessed by testing militarization against conscription.
3. *Policymakers and military leaders are aware of the decreased capability of their military, and factor that into their decisions conflict behavior, tending to refrain from use of military force.* Connection between militarization and use of force already established in the literature, and verified in chapter 3.

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<sup>105</sup> e.g. Wayman, Frank W.; J. David Singer; and Gary Goertz (1983). "Capabilities, Allocations, and Success in Military Disputes and Wars, 1816-1976". *International Studies Quarterly* 27:4 (December), pp. 497-515

Models Summary:

*Hypothesis 5: Governments which have abolished conscription are less likely to enter into military disputes.*

Model 4a.    DV: "Fatality"            Ordinal            COW  
                  IV: "Conscription"(t-2)    Binary            WRI

$$\Pr(\text{Fatality}_{it} = m \mid X_{it}) = F(\beta_1 \text{Conscription}_{it-2} + \beta_2 \text{Dem}_{it} + \beta_3 \text{Conscription}_{it} * \text{Dem}_{it} + \beta_4 \text{Trans}_{it} + \beta_5 \text{Dev}_{it} + \beta_6 \text{Mil}_{it} + \beta_7 \text{Down}_{it} + \beta_8 \text{MajPow}_{it})$$

Model 4b.    DV: "HostLevel"            Ordinal            COW  
                  IV: "Conscription"(t-2)    Binary            WRI

$$\Pr(\text{HostLev}_{it} = m \mid X_{it}) = F(\beta_1 \text{Conscription}_{it-2} + \beta_2 \text{Dem}_{it} + \beta_3 \text{Conscription}_{it} * \text{Dem}_{it} + \beta_4 \text{Trans}_{it} + \beta_5 \text{Dev}_{it} + \beta_6 \text{Mil}_{it} + \beta_7 \text{Down}_{it} + \beta_8 \text{MajPow}_{it})$$

5.e. Further analysis

Although conscription is decreasingly common among democracies, there are some governments which continue the practice for historical or other contingent reasons, yet nonetheless are generally observant of HRI. That is, observance of HRI does not require governments to abolish conscription, if the practice is instead diluted to be of little burden to conscripts. There is hardly any quantitative data on the exact nature of conscript service, apart from duration of service term. Limited qualitative analysis may be sufficient to help address this deficit. For example, conscription was used in Germany until its suspension in 2011, but the term was limited to 9 months (from 2 years in the 1960s), and the law allowed generous provisions for conscientious objectors and other exceptions; in 2007 the German government received 161,448 applications for conscientious objection, and in 2008 counted only 35,490 first-term conscripts in the ranks.<sup>106</sup> Anecdotal evidence suggests recent German conscript service imposed minimal demands on recruits, apart from the time served, and nearly zero risk of death

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<sup>106</sup>War Resisters' International (2008). "Country Report and Updates: Germany" online at [http://www.wri-irg.org/programmes/world\\_survey/country\\_report/en/Germany](http://www.wri-irg.org/programmes/world_survey/country_report/en/Germany)

or injury. One former German conscript reports serving his term while living with his parents.<sup>107</sup>

Interviews with former or current conscripts may help determine the actual burden conscription poses in countries with otherwise strong HRI observance.

## 6. Conclusions

The conclusion will deal especially, albeit briefly with the pragmatic consequences of this study. If observance of human rights is conducive to international peace, this suggests a strong incentive for policies and institutions which promote human rights globally, at least where policymakers are concerned with promoting peace. As discussed in the theory section, this is problematic: international institutions designed to promote human rights have rather ambiguous records. Some articles suggest the situation is worse than ambiguous: recent studies have sought to explain the fact that pro-torture authoritarian regimes are more likely to ratify anti-torture instruments than non-torture authoritarian regimes, focusing on the signaling effect of ratification for domestic constituencies.<sup>108</sup> These authors do not argue that such instruments increase torture, rather that they give a legitimacy to regimes which continue to use torture without affecting their observance of human rights ideals. This suggests that a necessary extension of this research is analysis of the problem of designing effective international institutions to promote HRI observance.

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<sup>107</sup> Felix Reichling, interview with the author, 11 December 2012.

<sup>108</sup> Vreeland, James Raymond (2008). "Political Institutions and Human Rights: Why Dictatorships Enter into the United Nations Convention Against Torture". *International Organization* 62 (Winter) pp. 65-101; Hollyer, James R. and B. Peter Rosendorff (2011). "Why do Authoritarian Regimes Sign the Convention Against Torture? Signaling, Domestic Politics, and Non-compliance". <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1876843>

**Table 1. Personal Integrity Rights Described by the UN Declaration of Human Rights**

<b>Article 3.</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.</li></ul>
<b>Article 4.</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their forms.</li></ul>
<b>Article 5.</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.</li></ul>
<b>Article 9.</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile.</li></ul>
<b>Article 12.</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.</li></ul>
<b>Article 13.</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state.</li><li>• (2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.</li></ul>
<b>Article 14.</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• (1) Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.</li><li>• (2) This right may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions genuinely arising from non-political crimes or from acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.</li></ul>

Source: Universal Declaration of Human Rights, <https://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml>